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Destinations... Japan Travel Guide The Yamasa Institute |
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Destinations... Japan Travel Guide The Yamasa Institute |
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Edited by: Declan Murphy Recommended: Suggested Itineraries Favorite Gifu moments... Best ways to get there Gifu Photogallery Newsgroups: fj.rec.travel.japan, Alt-FAQ Bulletin Boards: Fun/Clubs/Nightlife  Accommodation/Discounts
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Sekigahara is a small village in Gifu Prefecture, yet every Japanese person knows its name. Located in a strategic pass through which ancient Nakasendo highway passes on its way to Kyoto, in 1600 on September 15th, this quiet village was the scene of the greatest battle in Japanese history.
Two years had passed since the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. His young son Hideyori was too young to rule, and the five regents who Toyotomi Hideyoshi had selected to protect his son, had soon divided into factions in pursuit of absolute power. The leaders of these two factions were Ishida Mitsunari, and Tokugawa Ieyasu.
The leadup to the battle of Sekigahara began in the summer. On June 16th, Tokugawa Ieyasu had to leave the Regent's Council in Osaka and move back to his base in Edo (now Tokyo), in order to protect his territories from a threat posed by Uesugi Kagekatsu (allied to the Ishida faction). Knowing that a major showdown was likely, he left a castellan in control of Osaka Castle, another garrison at Fushimi Castle under the command of Torii Mototada (who pledged to Tokugawa Ieyasu that he would defend the bastion to the last man if attacked), and moved slowly north engaging in diplomacy - shoring up alliances, mending fences, gathering intelligence - and preparing to attack the Uesugi's strongly built mountain fortress, Aizu castle.
Tokugawa Ieyasu's plan to destroy Aizu castle involved combining the armies of the Tokugawa, Satake, Date, Mogami and Maeda. The Uesugi were to be surrounded, then eliminated. On July the 8th, Sakakibara Yasumasa who was one of Tokugawa's best commanders (he had been a key figure in the battles at Nagakute against Toyotomi Hideyoshi's forces in 1584) set out for Aizu with the advance force. Nearly two weeks later, Ieyasu's son and heir Tokugawa Hidetada lead the main force of 37,000 troops north, and at the same time thousands more samurai and ashigaru (foot soldiers and musketmen) from the Date, Maeda, Mogami, and from less powerful lords, began advancing on the Uesugi's territories from the north, east and west. On the 21st, Tokugawa Ieyasu himself set out with an additional 32,000 troops.
Only an attack from the west could save Aizu from inevitable destruction. Ishida Mitsunari and several collaborators quickly denounced Ieyasu, demanded that Torii Mototada surrender his control of Fushimi Castle (which could dominate Kyoto), and began mobilizing forces for an invasion of the east. Suspecting this would happen, Tokugawa Ieyasu had advanced towards Aizu slowly - taking 5 days march to reach Oyama, a distance of 65 kilometers (approx. 40 miles) that could usually be covered in one day's ride, but that was conveniently close to the fast flowing Tone river.
The situation was extremely unstable. One by one, important daimyo (often in strategically vital territories) were siding with Ishida. The most important of all was Mori Terumoto. The ruler of the second largest feudal domain in Japan, Mori controlled lands worth more than 1 million koku from his powerbase in Hiroshima. Quickly ousting the castellan guard at Osaka Castle, troops coordinated by Mori and Ishida attacked Fushimi Castle - which they could not afford to leave in the hands of Torii Mototada's forces before launching their campaign to the east to destroy the Tokugawa. Ishida's plans were to eliminate the treat posed by Fushimi, then advance east.
Further defections to the army of the west would politically and militarily isolate Tokugawa Ieyasu completely. In the north came the disturbing news that the Satake were refusing to attack the Uesugi. Tokugawa Ieyasu had to advance west, but could not leave his territories vulnerable to an attack from the rear during his absence. His son Tokugawa Hidetada was ordered to destroy the Satake, meanwhile the attack on the Uesugi had to be indefinitely postponed. Leaving lesser lords to keep the Uesugi hemmed in their mountain base, Ieyasu had to move west. His earlier caution was to pay quick dividends. Once he had been informed by a messenger from Torii Mototada of Ishida's demands, and from his spy network of the extent of danger faced, Tokugawa Ieyasu was able to quickly return to Edo by river boat down the fast flowing Tone river.
The only daimyo quick to rally to his support were those in the Mikawa (eastern Aichi) to Suruga areas along the Pacific coast. These included men such as Ikeda Terumasa, who had fought for Toyotomi Hideyoshi against the Tokugawa in 1584 during the Komaki and Nagakute campaigns (in which his father Ikeda Nobuteru had been killed). After Tokugawa Ieyasu transferred to the Kanto region in 1590, Ikeda Terumasa established himself at Yoshida castle in eastern Mikawa (Ieyasu's home province), and in 1594 married one of Tokugawa's daughters. Tokugawa Ieyasu's earlier diplomacy and caution began paying off as one by one these daimyo threw their support to the Tokugawa. Another reason was that as their domains were former Tokugawa territories that Ieyasu knew intimately, their lands would have been hard to defend. While undertaking quick preparations in Edo castle, Ieyasu wrote letters to 108 of the 214 daimyo. Of these, 99 of the replies offered support.
The forces of Ishida and Mori overran Fushimi castle, Torii Mototada defending the castle to the last man and buying Tokugawa Ieyasu 10 very valuable days. This accomplished, the main body of the western army could now advance through Ishida's home province of Ohmi (his castle was Sawayama, near present day Hikone) to the east. The army of the west, as the coalition is often referred to, destroyed several minor castles and fortresses held by Tokugawa supporters, took complete control of Ise province and the western portions of the Tokaido highway, stormed forward from this considerable base onto the Owari plain (now the western part of Aichi Prefecture) capturing Ogaki castle, and sending more troops to the strategically important Gifu castle commanded by Oda Hidenobu, to gain his support as well as a key base astride the Nakasendo.
Once again, Tokugawa Ieyasu's caution, diplomacy and preparation paid off. Ikeda Terumasa attacked and seized Gifu castle, giving Ieyasu a strong forward position that he could supply via both the Nakasendo and Tokaido. Ikeda and the other daimyo who had rallied to the Tokugawa then pressed a further 20 kilometers (approx. 12 miles) west and established defensive field positions at Akasaka - blocking the main route of advance of the western army and immobolizing the troops who had captured Ogaki castle. This bought Tokugawa Ieyasu more time, and he arrived after a long forced march from Edo with 32,000 plus troops to a campsite prepared by Ikeda. The scene was set for the showdown, the first major question was where would it happen?
The second major question was the whereabouts of Tokugawa Hidetada, and the main force of some 38,000 troops. Hidetada had promptly destroyed the recalcitrant Satake, and then deployed to Kai. The plan had been for for Hidetada to advance along the Nakasendo while his father marched down the Tokaido, meet in Owari Province and then use their combined numbers and firepower to defeat the western army. Hidetada's force had been at Karuizawa on September 1st (the day that Ieyasu had departed Edo), however bad weather (the Nakasendo traverses a mountainous route) and a siege of Ueda Castle (Shinano Province), and to some extent poor communications delayed his advance. The siege of Ueda was a particularly bad decision. Ordered by Ieyasu to isolate the castle, Hidetada instead decided to capture it. The problem was that Ueda castle was defended by the 56 year old veteran Sanada Masayuki, a skilled general and more than a match for the 21 year old Hidetada. 4 days were lost before Hidetada abandoned his attempt to destroy the castle and resumed his march south. The end result was that during the strategy sessions taking place at Akasaka, Ieyasu had to come to terms with the fact that just over half of his main army was still some 200 kilometers (approx. 125 miles) away, and there was no certainty as to the timing of its arrival.
In Akasaka, the debate was whether to engage Ogaki castle, or surround it and then bypass it in order to attack Ishida's home province on the other side of the Sekigahara pass. Ii Naomasa, a trusted retainer who had joined Ieyasu before the battle of Nagashino some 25 years earlier, advocated attacked Ogaki. Ieyasu, mindful that he was without Hidetada's troops and that a successful attack on Sawayama castle would not only destroy Ishida's powerbase, but would also leave the road to Kyoto and Osaka open, decided to leave sufficient troops at Ogaki to contain the units there, and move forward. Morale in the eastern camp was high.
The situation was completely different in the western camp. Leadership was an issue, with a lack of trust between the various commanders a key contributor. Communications and preparations were less than adequate, formations slower to deploy. The true cost of the 10 day siege of Fushimi castle was beginning to hurt. Other sieges hurt even more - 15,000 men besieged the castle of Hosokawa Yusai at Tanabe in Tango province on the Sea of Japan coast, and these troops never reached the battlefield of Sekigahara. The castle was defended by a garrison of just 500 men. Another castle, this time the strategically vital Otsu castle at the southern end of Lake Biwa defended by 3000 troops under Kyogoku Takatsugu, kept another 15,000 troops away from the battlefield. Mori Terumoto, who was Mitsunari's most important ally, was deliberatingly keeping some 30,000 of his troops in Osaka. Rumours of betrayal and shifting loyalties abounded.
Most frustrating of all was poor intelligence and an inability to track the maneuvers and deployments of the Tokugawa. The number of daimyo supporting Ieyasu was a frustration and surprise for Ishida Mitsunari, as was the speed with which Ieyasu had managed to move large numbers of men from Kanto to Owari, capturing Gifu as well. According to the plans, Tokugawa Ieyasu was supposed to be north of Edo fighting the Uesugi. Yet Mitsunari's forward units were reporting that instead Ieyasu was armed to the teeth and directly opposite their lines. Even more disturbing was Ieyasu's strategic positioning, Mitsunari immediately realized that unless he moved immediately, he could soon be cut off from Sawayama and Kyoto and surrounded.
To evade the trap, the army of the west decided to move at once to the narrow pass of Sekigahara, leaving a garrison of 7,500 men at Ogaki, and block the route west. Heavy rain began to fall, and forward units of the Tokugawa army were able to harass the rearguard units as they made their way through the night to Sekigahara. Despite the foul weather and heavy rain, trees were felled to build palisades to protect the musketmen from cavalry, and earthworks constructed. There was little opportunity to sleep or cook, and when morning came the plain was covered in dense fog limiting visibility. The prime objective of most of the men was to get some fires going to help dry out - particularly those who had been unable to keep gunpowder protected from the weather.
Ishida Mitsunari placed his headquarters on the northern flank of the western army, on a spur of Mount Sasao that commanded the Nakasendo and offered a good view of the entire battlefield. On the south flank, also in a strong position were the 15,600 troops of Kobayakawa Hideaki on Mount Matsuo, and in the center, also in a strong position due to high ground at the base of Mount Tengu, The 17,000 men commanded by Ukita Hideie and other units. In short, the army of the west had a strong defensive position. The position was even stronger, because nearly 28,000 more troops were on Mount Nangu, as it placed them in a perfect position to encircle Tokugawa Ieyasu's reserve units and trap the eastern forces.
There had been numerous skirmished during the deployments of the night, but the battle didn't begin in earnest until the fog lifted around 8am, when Ii Naomasa's troops charged Ukita Hideie's position in the center of the western line. As the matchlock arquebusiers (a type of firearm introduced to Japan by the Portuguese from the middle of the 16th century) of the troops commanded by Fukushima Masanori (Owari province) tore into the Ukita battalions, other units began to attack the western army across the line, including Ishida's position. A fierce battle of attrition began with appalling casualties in the muddy fields of the plain. The army of the west had a numerical superiority, and the absence of Tokugawa Hidetada with the bulk of the Tokugawa army was crucial. It looked like the army of the west was going to win the day.
At this stage of the battle, Ishida lit a pre-arranged signal fire to order Kobayakawa Hideaki (15,600 men) on the right flank, and the units on Mount Nangu behind Tokugawa Ieyasu into action. To Ishida's immense dismay, the units did not move. Runners were sent, but to no avail. Ishida did not know, that in the lead up to the battle Kobayakawa had been offered lands by Tokugawa Ieyasu in exchange for secretly agreeing to switch sides during the decisive battle. When Kobayakawa finally did command his troops to attack (prompted by volleys of musket fire from Tokugawa's troops to "remind" him of his secret undertaking), his forces crashed through the lines of the Otani and Ukita troops, not those of Tokugawa Ieyasu.
The entire center of the army of west began to disintegrate. Ishida himself fled the battlefield (along with many of his men) to nearby Mount Ibuki where he was captured 3 days later, taken to Kyoto and beheaded. Months of preparation and manuvering led to a decisive encounter that was all over in about 6 hours. Casualties were appalling, particularly for the west.
Towards the end the battle, Ii Naomasa was wounded by a musket shot during savage fighting with the Shimazu forces, who had continued to hold their lines. The Shimazu realized that they faced immiment defeat, and that the withdrawal route was now blocked by flanking forces. In an reckless and audacious move, they decide to withdraw from the battlefield - not to the rear but by instead advancing straight through the center of the Tokugawa lines. It says something of the sheer chaos of the situation that this was successful - albeit with further carnage inflicted by the Ii - riding straight past Ieyasu's headquarters. Only a handful of Shimazu's men, some 80 in total, reached Kyushu safely. His nephew was one of those who didn't make it, loosing his head (literally) after swapping helmets with his uncle to assist with the escape. Such sacrifices were common at Sekigahara.
Satsuma, a feudal domain located in the southern part of Kyushu with a castle town at Kagoshima, continued to be ruled during the Edo period by the Shimazu family. Satsuma was also one of the four domains which overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in the Meiji Restoration that restored the Emperor to authority in 1868. Men from Satsuma and Choshu dominated government in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. During the Edo period, Satsuma was prevented from having a national role because the domain fought against the Tokugawa at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The resentment felt by the Satsuma was one of the reasons for the Meiji Restoration. The scars of Sekigahara never really healed.
Tours - The Japan Discovery Tours visits Sekigahara
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